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COMBINED ANNUITY AND SINGLE PREMIUM LIFE
INSURANCE UNDER THE ESTATE TAX: EFFECT OF
ASSIGNING THE INSURANCE*
AGE and physical condition often preclude elderly persons from obtaining
life insurance.' But many insurance companies offer to sell such individuals
single premium policies without a medical examination on a condition which
distinguishes such policies from orthodox insurance: the insured must relieve
the company of the risk of early death by the simultaneous purchase of an
annuity.2 Although the single premium for the insurance part of such a
* Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 21 U.S.L. WE R
3233 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1953).
1. All companies have age limits beyond which they will not issue ordinary life
insurance despite medical fitness. Prudential Life Insurance Company of America, for
example, has an age limit of seventy.
2. The following companies issue combination single premium life insurance and
life annuity policies without medical examination:
Ratio of Total Maximum
Premium to Inmirance Total
Face Value Prendum
American National variable $ 50,000
Columbian National 110% 10,000
Continental Assurance. 110% 110,000
Dominion Life 110% 110,000
Equitable, Iowa 110% 55,000
Great-West 107% 133,750
Life of Virginia 103% 54,000
Manhattan Life 110% 55,000
Manufacturers 108% 200,000
Occidental, California 107% (a)
Ohio National 110% 27,500
Pan-American 110% 55,000
Prudential 110% 220,000
United States Life 110% 55,000
(a) $25,000 insurance plus the annuity.
From WHo WRiTms WHAT (1952), a standard insurance reference.
These combinations have achieved considerable popularity. Prudential, for example,
had 1,694 of these contracts in force on September, 1952, providing insurance totaling
$31,209,818. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from James V. Hughes, Manager
of the General Actuarial Division, Prudential Life Insurance Company of America, dated
December 5, 1952, in Yale Law Library.
Some ordinary life insurance is also written without a medical examination,
MACLEAN, LIVE INSURANcE 255-8 (7th ed. 1951).
For discussion of the difference between annuities and life insurance, see Cohen,
Annuities and Transfer Taxes, 7 KAN. B.A.J. 139 (1938) ; Note, 26 VA. L. REv. 230 (1939).
In VANCE, INSURANCE: §§ 1, 10 (3d ed. 1951) the contract of insurance is defined
largely in terms of "risk," which is designated as one of th essential elements of an
insurance contract. The insurance-annuity combination involves some risk, but not of
an insurance nature; rather it is an investment risk-that incident to the management and
investment of the insured's funds.
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combination purchase is below the face amnount of the policy,3 the difference
is more than made up by the amount paid for the annuity. In fact, total
premiums paid for the combination usually equal about one hundred ten percent
of the face value of the insurance policy.4 If the insured dies hefore the
insurance premium plus accrued interest equals the face value, the proceeds
of the policy are paid partly from the unused balance of the annuity und.7,
Because the insurance-annuity combination thus differs from urth, ,lox
insurance, problems have arisen as to whether it should be treated as "insur-
ance" for purposes of the federal estate ta.- 0 In 1941, when life insurance
proceeds up to $40,000 could be excluded from a decedent's gross estate,-
the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Le Gicrse s decided that the insurance
part of such a combination was not "insurance" within the meaning of that
statute. Indicating that the policy of the exemption was to promote insurance
contracts which protect beneficiaries against the financial risk of the early
death of those who support them, the Court found that such an element was
absent from the combination. Since the presence of the annuity removed all
elements of insurance risk,2 the Court viewed the combined purchase as a
"'single investment"' 0 and declared the exemption inapplicable."
3. For an explanation of how net single premiums are computed, stv Mwr_. M. op.
cit. supra note 2, at 96-101.
4. For list of companies see note 2 supra.
5. See discussion in Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 541 (1941).
6. For discussion of some of the tax problems, other than the one cnidered by this
Note, raised by the insurance-annuity combination and by annuities in general, see
Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts Undcr Estate and Inheritance Taxes, 39
MicH. L RLT. 856 (1941).
7. "The value of the gross estate... shall be determined by including the value...
of all property ... [t]o the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the
excess over $40,O00 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent on his own life." Revenue Act of 1926, §
302(g), 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U.S.C. § 411(g) (1935).
The first of these insurance-annuity combinations before the courts wvas one unit-a
life annuity with a lump sum payable at death. That combination was denied the 40x-
emption because the necessary insurance risk %as absent and it %%-as considered as an
investment with income reserved for life and with a remainder to the h2neficiaries. Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 3S0 (1st Cir. 1939).
8. 312 U.S. 531 (1941). Estate of Keller v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 543 (141),
and Tyler v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 657 (1941), dealing with the same problem, were
decided the same day as Le Gicrse.
9. See note 2 sztpra.
10. "Investment" is used here in the colloquial stnse by jhich stockzs and Lond-, are
termed investments while insurance is not. Functionally, however, life insurance in cun-
trast with indemnity insurance is a form of investment. See V.:itc, Ir: .v:p 32, 1 %
101, 105 (3d ed. 1951). Although the terminology may thus be inapt, the distinz-thi'
is nevertheless a valid one. The exemption (see note 7 supra| applid srQreically t.,)
"insurance"; it seems appropriate to have denied that exemption to utlivr i. de-L Ui
saving "investnments" which lacked the essential elements of insurance.
11. "To say they are distinct transactions is to ignore actuality . . . [Thuyl fail
to spell out any element of insurance risk." Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 540-1
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The exemption for insurance was removed from the estate tax in 1942 ;12
hence no estate tax problem is now presented by the insurance-annuity com-
bination so long as the insurance 13 is the property of the insured at death.
The full proceeds of the insurance part of the combination will be included
in the gross estate of a decedent whether the package be considered insurance
or an investment.14 But when by irrevocable assignment the insurance policy
has been separated from the annuity,'5 the Le Gierse holding that the com-
bination is not insurance troubles courts forced to decide whether to include
the proceeds of the insurance in the gross estate of the insured. Taking the
position that they cannot apply established criteria for handling orthodox
insurance,' 6 the courts undertake an analysis of the policy as an "investment."
In 1946 the Second Circuit in Burr v. Commissioner 17 included the insur-
ance proceeds in the decedent's estate although the policies had previously
been irrevocably assigned to certain beneficiaries.' 8 The decedent purchased the
(1941). Insurance contemplates shifting the economic risk of death to the insurer.
When a combination policy is purchased, the insured himself covers that risk by buying
the annuity.
12. The provision exempting the first $40,000 was omitted from the Revenue Act
of 1942.
13. For the sake of convenience, this Note will continue to call the insurance part
of the combination "life insurance," even though it may not technically qualify as "insur-
ance" under the Le Gierse ruling.
14. The proceeds would be includible as property owned by the decedent at death
under IxT. REv. CODE § 811(a).
15. Under an irrevocable assignment all the legal incidents of ownership may be
transferred. These include: the right to the economic benefits of the policy; the
power to change the beneficiary; to surrender, cancel or assign the policy; to revoke nn
assignment; to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain a loan against the cash sur-
render value of the policy. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 80, art. 25 (1934).
16. From 1919 to 1942 INT. REv. CODE § 811(g) included in the estate the face
value of policies "taken out by the decedent upon his own life." The Treasury Depart-
ment, in part to appease the courts, inconsistently utilized two tests in determining
whether a decedent had "taken out" a policy within the statutory meaning. One test
measured includibility by whether the decedent paid the premiums; the other tests, by
whether the decedent held "incidents of ownership" after the policy was transferred.
For detailed descriptions of the antics of the Treasury in this connection, see Eisenstein,
Estate Taxes and the Higher Learning of the Supreme Court, 3 TAx L. REV. 395,
514-21 (1948); Schlesinger, Taxes and Instrance: A Suggested Solution to the Un-
certain Cost of Dying, 55 HARv. L. REv. 226, 230 (1941). The last Treasury Decision
before the 1942 amendment removed the "taken out by the decedent" language, aban-
doned the incidents of ownership test. Insurance henceforth was to be includible if the
decedent paid the premiums. T.D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 427.
IxT. REv. CoDE § 811(g)(2) specifies the criteria to be used today. See notes 27,
28 infra.
17. 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 785 (1946).
18. Estate of Cora C. Reynolds v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 44 (1941), was the first
case dealing with the general problem. The transferred policy was included in the
decedent's estate as a transfer designed to take effect at death and in which the decedent
had reserved a life income. In that case the policy was transferred to trustees.
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combination when he was seventy-five. Shortly after the purchase, he made the
transfer and paid a gift tax.19 But the court considered the combination
indivisible for estate tax purposes. Basing its decision on the Le Gicrse
rationale that this was a single investment, it found that the annuity payments
constituted income from the entire investment package. Since the court felt
that the decedent had reserved that income to himself for life, the arrange-
ment was likened to an annuity with a life estate retained and with a
remainder to be transferred at death. Thus it was held includible under
Internal Revenue Code Section 811(c)(1)(B), which taxes as part of the
estate transfers of property the income from which is reserved to the grantor
for life.2 0 In February, 1952, the Sixth Circuit in Conway St. Glenn 21 followed
Burr in an indistinguishable fact situation.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Bohnen v. Harrison 0 recently
held on facts almost identical to Burr that such irrevocably assigned insurance
was not includible in the insured's estate. Mrs. Bolnen purchased the com-
bination when she was sixty-two years old. Immediately after the purchase
she assigned all her rights in the insurance policy to certain beneficiaries
and paid a gift tax on the transfer.2 3 The Seventh Circuit, affirming the
district court's judgment for the taxpayer,2 4 held that the insurance wa-,
separable from the annuity and that the assignment took the policy procceds
out of the decedent's estate. The court also ruled that the income re: erved
by retention of the annuity was traceable to the annuity only and not to the
whole investment. The Bohnen court, therefore, squarely rejected Burrs
19. The valuation of a one-premium life insurance policy for the gift tax is the
cost at the time of the gift of acquiring a similar policy. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103. § 8 .19(i)
(1943). This is so even though the cash surrender value is smaller. Guggenheim v.
Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941). The same basis for valuation is applied to a gift #,f
the insurance part of an insurance-annuity combination, despite the fact that there iL
no ordinary insurance risk and the purchase of the annuity was required for purchase of
the insurance. Letter of Deputy Commissioner D. S. Bliss, March 27, 1941. CCH ERo.
EsT. & GlrT TAx RFs. 1 5478.55 (1946). The annuity purchase w.as merely a condition
precedent to the purchase of the insurance, and not part of the consideration for the
insurance.
The gift tax paid on a transfer which is later included in the estate may be credited
against the estate tax. Ix-r. REv. CoDE § 313(a).
20. Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871, 872 n.1 (2d Cir. 1946). I:;T. REv. CoTF
§ 811(c) (1) (B) includes in the estate transfers "under which [the decedent] has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death
or for any period which does not in fact end before his death . . . the possession or
enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property. . .
21. 193 F2d 965 (6th Cir. 1952).
22. 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 21 U.S.L. WEzn 3233 (U.S. Mar.
9, 1953).
23. See note 19 supra for discussion of valuation of the transferred insurance for
the gift tax.
24. Bohnen v. Harrison, 100 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1951). The district court based
its decision on the fact that there had been no retained reversionary intcrest as there had
been in Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945).
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rationale and its extension of the Le Gierse doctrine; but the court accepted
the conclusion that the insurance-annuity transaction constituted an "invest-
ment" rather than insurance. On March 9, 1953, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The Bohnen opinion appears justified in rejecting Burr's application of
Le Gierse. Le Gierse dealt only with the question of whether the insurance
part of the combination was insurance within the purview of the estate tax
exemption. No assignment had been made, and it was conceded that the
whole package was includible unless exempt as insurance.25 The Le Gierse
holding that the combination was a single investment -when purchased does
not preclude a later splitting of that investment by assignment of the life
insurance.26
The Le Gierse ruling could be restricted further and held wholly inap-
plicable to the type of question presented in the Burr, Comay, and Bohnen
cases. In Le Gierse the Supreme Court pointed out that the exemption under
consideration was designed to protect insurance contracts, which-by distri-
buting losses-guard individuals against the risk of the premature death of
those upon whom they depend for support. The policy behind Le Gicrse,
therefore, seems to be a recognition that protection of such persons is not
furthered by the insurance-annuity combination, which in fact involves no
distribution of individual losses. But such social policy provides no basis
for distinguishing the assigned insurance portion of a combination from
assigned orthodox insurance in order to include it within the gross estate
under Section 811(c).27 In the hands of assignees, both policies would be
precisely the same. And identical treatment for the policies in no sense would
permit taxpayers to defeat any.legislative policy geared to the special "insur-
ance risk" nature of the transaction. Present legislative policy is designed
to include almost all insurance in the gross estate. But assigned insurance is
included in the gross estate only if the decedent had "incidents of ownership"
in the policy either at death or after January 10, 1941, whichever was earlier,
or if he originally took out the policy on his own life after that date."2 In
25. Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531, 537-8 (1941).
26. The annuitant's rights are also assignable in the absence of a condition to the
contrary in the annuity contract. RFSTAThmENT, CoxRmAcrs §§ 151, 155 (1932). In the
Burr case, for example, the annuity was assignable. Transcript of Record, p. 28, Burr
v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946).
27. According to INT. Rzv. CoDE § 811(g) (2) the value of the gross estate is
determined by including proceeds of life insurance "receivable by . . other beneficiaries
... [and] purchased with premiums ... paid ... by the decedent, in proportion that the
amount so paid by the decedent bears to the total premiums paid for the insurance . . .
or with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of owner-
ship, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person."
28. Section 811(g) of the Code is to be applied as provided by § 404(c) of the
Revenue Act of 1942:
"The amendments . . . shall be applicable only to estates of decedents dying after
the date of the enactment of this Act [October 21, 1942] ; but in determining the propor-
[Vol. 62
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those limited situations where insurance is still excluded from the gro s
estate, therefore, the exclusion is based entirely on the fact of assignmeni.
By surrender of the "incidents of ownership" of the policy, the decedent is
considered to have made a present gift of the policy, with no economic interest
passing at his death. -'9 Thus in Bohncn the Supreme Court could, with'jut
logical inconsistency, distinguish Lc Giersc: it could continue to treat the
insurance-annuity combination as failing to contain those elements of "insur-
ance risk" needed to qualify for the pre-1942 insurance exemption; at the
same time, it could handle the assigned insurance portion of the combinatiun
in the same manner as orthodox insurance for the purpose of determining
whether it should be included in the gross estate under Section 811(g)(2)
(A). Under the facts of the Bohnen case, such treatment as true insurance
would probably lead to exclusion of the proceeds from the grosb estate. But
it would provide a far more realistic and workable solution to the tax problem
raised by the combination than present tortuous attempts to fit the transactio- '
into an "investment" category.
The Burr rationale that the annuity payments represent income from the
total investment appears higly unrealistic. The annuity could have hen
purchased alone-even though the insurance could not have been purchasel
without the annuity-and the income therefrom would have been the !iame.,-
And if the insurance policy had been cashed in by the beneficiaries, nu change
would have resulted in the annuity payments.31 In viewing the xi:6tence of
the power to cash in the policies as immaterial because unexercised, Burr failed
to consider the significance of the immutability of the annuity I'ayncnts a-,
evidence of their source.32 Further evidence of the independence of the
tion of premiums paid ... by the decedent . . . the amount so paid . . . on or iJor
January 10, 1941 [the effective date of T.D. 5032, 1941-1 Ctm. Bu.. 41j, 01all t.
excluded if at no time after such date the decedent possessed an incidult of o nerhip
in the policy."
According to U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.27 (1943) if the decdent died cn or Ibfire
October 21, 1942 the excess of such insurance over $4,00U is included: "To the ente;t
to which such insurance was taken out by the decedent upon his own life after January
10, 1941, and... [t]o the extent to which such insurance wvas taken out by the decednt
upon his own life on or before January 10, 1941, and with respect to which the decedent
possessed any of the incidents of ownership ...after such date, or, in the case of a
decedent dying on or before such date, at the time of his death."
29. Ballard v. Helburn, 9 P'. Supp. 812, 814, 815 (W.D. Ky. 1933). aff'd, 85 1'.2d
613 (6th Cir. 1936). See also Flick's Estate v. Commissioner, 16t F.2d 733 (5th Cir.
1948).
30. The annuity and the life insurance are treated as independent contracts by the
insurer. The premiums are the same as if the policies were purchased separately. ThQ
reserves are calculated separately. Each is a single independent contract on its face
See Meisenholder, Taxation of Annity Contracts under Estate and Indicritance Taxes,
39 AicH. L R.v. 856, 883 (1941). See also Conway v. Glenn, 97 F. Supp. 331, 332
(W.D. Ky. 1951).
31. Meisenholder, szpra note 30, at 8.
32. Burr declared the combination to be "analogous to a simple annuity with principal
payable at death," citing Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), ccrl.
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annuity payments from the insurance is the fact that the dividends from the
insurance policies themselves were paid directly to the beneficiaries as
holders of the policies without regard to the ownership of the annuity. 3 More-
over, when this question was raised in an income tax context the payments
were held to derive only from the annuity and not from the whole investment.14
Closeted in the conclusion that income was retained from the whole "in-
vestment," Burr did not find significant the fact that a gift of real value was
denied, 315 U.S. 821 (1942), and Commissioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 634 (1941), as support for the taxability of such annuities
to the estate. Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871, 872 (2d Cir. 1946). The ClLse case,
however, concerned "joint and survivor non-participating annuity contracts" and not
an annuity with principal payable at death. Wilder also concerned survivorship
annuities.
The annuity with principal payable at death is the kind considered in Old Colony v.
Commissioner, 102 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1939). See Note 7 supra. Such an annuity is not
divisible for surrender purposes because the contract is one unit. See Meisenholder, supra
note 30, at 884. By contrast, the insurance-annuity combination may be divided and the
insurance surrendered. See note 30 supra.
There are also refund and cash refund annuities. Under the refund annuity, the
insurer continues payments on the annuity after the annuitant's death until the total
payments equal the original purchase price. The cash refund type of annuity contract
provides that at death the excess of original premium paid over total annuity payments
will be paid immediately in cash. Such annuities give a lower yield than the straight
life annuities where there is no refund and payments terminate at death. MACZAmII,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 51-2. A
33. In fact such payments are not "dividends" in the same sense as dividends paid
on corporate stocks. They are merely an adjustment of the premium cost. Weeks v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 248, 255 (1951) ; MACLEAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 158-87.
34. In one case the Commissioner tried to tax as income the amount annually
received from the investment. The Tax Court held that under § 22(b) (2) (A) only
the amount calculable as interest on the purchase price of the annuity was taxable as
income-the rest being recognized as a return of capital-and that the component parts
of the investment should be regarded separately in determining the receipts attributable
to each. Koehrer v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. 219 (1945). Cf. Helvering v. Meredith,
140 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1944) (annuity payments taxed as annuities under § 22(b) (2) (A)
and life insurance dividends not taxed until they exceed aggregate premiums paid).
INT. REv. CODE § 22(b) (2) (A) provides: "Amounts received as an annuity ... shall
be included in gross income; except that there shall be excluded ... the excess of the
amount received in the taxable year over an amount equal to 3 per centum of the ...
premiums ... until the aggregate amount excluded ... equals the . . . premiums ... )
The same section also excludes amounts received as dividends from an insurance policy
until such payments exceed the premiums paid.
This section recognizes the fact that annuity payments represent a return of principal
with interest. The 3% figure is used because it is assumed that at least that much of
the return represents interest and therefore should be taxable income. U.S. Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.22(b) (2)-2 (1943). The tax in effect seems to be a 6% tax because figured
each year on the basis of the original premium, part of which is consumed each year. See
Comment, 11 T mp. L.Q. 567, 568 (1937).
Under U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18 (1942), when a transferor retains the income
from a part only of transferred property only "a corresponding portion of the value of
the property should be included." It would seem, therefore, that under this regulation
the insurance proceeds are not includible.
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completely transferred before the death of the insured. The insured received
no income from the transferred insurance policies, since the only distributed
income was represented by the insurance dividends, which the beneficiaries
received. Nor did he retain any reversionary interest.35 And no additional powers
over the original gift passed to the beneficiaries by reason of the transferor's
death.36 The inclusion of the transferred portion of the "investment" under
Section 811(c) (1) (B)37 therefore seems unwarranted. The transfer was
merely one way of making a gift that could have been in cash. If this had
been done no estate tax issue would have arisen and the gift would have
been subject only to the lower gift tax even under the Burr reasoning.as A
similar amount might also have been transferred by giving property outright
of the same value. Moreover, if the transferees had exercised their power to
cash in the life insurance policies they would have been in the same position
as if they had initially received cash. So long as the insurance proceeds are
viewed as part of an "investment," there seems to be no valid reasun for
penalizing those transferees who do not elect immediately to realize the
present cash value of the investment transferred to them.
Although the Burr "investment" analysis therefore appears erroneous in
view of the factual nature of the transaction involved, Bohnen's holding that
all the proceeds of the insurance policy paid at death are completely exempt
is also open to objection. The Bohncn court looked exclusively at the
techniques of the transaction. Noting that the insurance and the annuity
35. In Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945), the transferor reserved
the right to the return of the policies if he survived the beneficiaries. Pointing out that
this was not insurance under the Le Gicrse ruling, the Court held it includible in the
gross estate as a transfer "intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at . ..
death." The Court decided the question merely on the basis of the decedent's possession
of the reversionary interest; it found it unnecessary to reach the question of whcther
or not there was retained income-the problem which the courts discussed almost e.-
clusively in the Burr, Conway, and Bolnen cases.
36. The gift had a value when transferred, and the transferor's death in no way affected
that value. The fact that death resulted in an addition to the original gift did not change
the beneficiaries' power over the original gift.
Even after the policy matures at death, it may be left intact with the company %,hich
will pay interest thereon. MACLEAIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 503-7. In that case, the
policy must still be "cashed in" in order for the beneficiaries to realize its malue--just
as the policy could have been cashed in prior to death to realize the value of the original
gift.
37. For text of section, see note 20 supra.
38. The federal gift tax rate is only about three quarters of the estate tax rate.
Although the difference was originally e-plained on the basis of the fact that the taxes were
enacted at different times, many subsequent reasons have been given. The present rate
was first enacted in 1932. Some thought the lower rate would encourage the transfer of
personal wealth during life. See Representative Crisp's remarks of March 10, 1932, in
75 Cox.. REc. 5691 (1932); Harriss, Legislative History of Fcderal Gift Taxation. IS
T-s 531, 536 (1940); Magill, The Federal Gift Tax, 40 CoL L Rw,. 773, 776, 791
(1940).
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were independently handled, it excluded all proceeds from the estate. But
such treatment does not take account of the fact that the donees at the
insured's death received a second gift-measured by the difference between
the value of the policy just prior to death and the face value.
Within the framework of the present policy of refusing to treat the insurance
part of a combination purchase as "insurance," a better approach than either
Burr or Bohnen would include in the decedent's estate that part of the insurance
proceeds which the beneficiaries actually receive as a result of death. Such
an amount could be included under Section 811(c)(1)(C) of the Code,
which taxes as part of the estate transfers "intended to take effect .. . at...
death." Neither Burr nor Bohnen, which rested on an interpretation of Section
811(c) (1) (B), 9 considered that provision. Yet a reasonable view of the
transaction seems to place it within the scope of that section. As the annuity
payments are made, decreasing the annuity principal, the lump sum insurance
premium held by the insurance company increases in value through investment
earnings. The increase in the cash surrender value of the policy reflects this
rise in value.40 At death the annuity payments cease and the face amount of
the insurance policy is paid to the beneficiaries. The difference between the
value of the original insurance premium plus accrued interest just before death
and the face value of the policy is covered by the remaining annuity principal. 41
The initial gift of the policy could be viewed as the transfer of a liquid
security which might be converted into cash at any time before death. And
the annuity could be considered as a trust from which the settlor reserves
yearly payments for life, with the remaining corpus to be used to pay the face
value of the insurance policy if the policy is not converted before the settlor's
death. Thus regarded, the original gift would not be included in the estate
because it is complete before death and enjoyment can be realized at any
time by surrender of the policy; the trust-measured by the difference between
the cash surrender value of the policy just before death and its face value 42
39. For text of section, see note 20 spra.
40. For some time after an insurance policy is first written the cash surrender value
is lower than the original lump sum premium because of the "loading factor"--the amount
added to the net premium to cover the cost of administration, and to give a surplus for
unanticipated losses. VANCE, INsuRAxcE 67 (3d ed. 1951); see also KNIGHT, ADVANCED
LIF- INsuRANcE, 127-46 (1926). For an example of how the cash surrender value rises
yearly see Transcript of Record, p. 23, Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.
1946).
41. This is true at least in the situation where the decedent does not outlive his life
expectancy. If he lives "too long," of course, no annuity principal will remain-snce
it will have been consumed by the annual payments. The essential point, however, for
the Le Gierse decision is that the initial risk of the insured dying soon was eliminated
by the purchase of the annuity. After many years, when the annuity principal is gone,
the investment earnings of the insurance policy will have made up the difference between
the insurance premium and its face value.
42. The cash surrender value should be the value used for the tax purpose here
because that is the only value actually realizable to the assignees. Unfortunately this
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-would be included, however, for that is the economic interest which shift-
to the beneficiaries as a result of death and so falls within the terms of Section
811 (c) (1) (C).
Should the Supreme Court in deciding Bohnen accept the view that
Le Gierse precludes it from treating the assigned policy as insurance, the Court
would face at least three alternatives in handling the transaction under Sec-
tion 811 (c) : it could affirm the Seventh Circuit's holding that none of the
proceeds are includible in the gross estate; it could reverse the Seventh
Circuit and adopt in tolo the rationale of the Burr opinion; or it could
attempt to split the proceeds so as to include within the estate only that real
economic interest which actually passes at death to the beneficiaries. Within
an investment rationale, the last approach appears most closely in harmony
with the factual realities of the case. But all involve a difference in tax
treatment between assigned orthodox insurance and assigned portion of an
insurance-annuity combination that is, perhaps, unwarranted.
The Court also has the alternative of distinguishing Le Gicrse and handling
the combination in Bohnen as true insurance under Section 811(g). The sole
reason for presently denying such treatment appears to be Le Giersc's previous
determination that the combination in the hands of the purchaser at death
should be denied special tax advantages then given by Congress for the pur-
pose of stimulating the purchase of orthodox insurance. Since that public
policy justification is applicable only to the special pre-1942 insurance exemp-
tion and is absent where the question merely involves proper treatment of the
assigned insurance portion of a combination, this 811(g) solution appears
most equitable.
might involve a double tax on the difference between the cash surrender value at deati
and the value upon which the gift tax was paid since the cash surrender value at death
might still be lower than the gift tax basis. For explanation of gift tax ev aluation see
note 19 supra; for full explanation of cash surrender value basis, see \TAxcu, I:;s, .x
73-4 (3d ed. 1951). Some credit, however, may be allowed for the gift tax paid. INT.
REv. CoDE § 813(a).
19531
